Everyone knows the history of our relations with the Arab States in recent years and that they have been greatly affected by the actions of Egypt, whose influence is very strong in this regard. If we can improve our relations, it may be possible to do something to reduce tensions between the Arab states and Israel and try to reach an agreement and a definitive peace. I really believe that it is not possible to do anything effective in this particular situation if we cannot reduce these tensions between the Arab states and Israel. We also have a commitment under the tripartite guarantee. I am far from happy. I do not see how we can fulfil our obligations if there is to be between Israel and the Arab states. I do not see what we would do if Egypt attacked Israel or if Israel suddenly went to the Jordan Valley. I cannot believe that this country would be in a position other than an extremely enviable position. This too should have been clarified before and not after, we agreed with Egypt. The Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1954 ended the presence of British forces along the Suez Canal in June 1956. If we had left Sudan but kept control of the Suez Canal, our actions would have been immoral, but they would have been at least rational.
If we had concluded military agreements with Israel, as proposed by the Leader of the Opposition, while preserving our facilities in Sudan, we might have left the Suez Canal with some emanation. As a result, all three of us have abandoned them. There is now a withdrawal of British power from this central position in the Middle East at the margins. Of course, it is clear to all of us that the government did not have a simple or clear choice in this matter. The position they inherited was difficult and our resources were strained. In such circumstances, withdrawals are sometimes necessary, but they are only justified if they are resignations on prepared positions. 7 See Hallberg, C. H., The Suez Canal (N.Y., 1931); Arnold Sir Wilson: The Suez Canal (London, 1939); Siegfried, Andre, Suez and Panama (London, 1940); H. J. Schonfleld: The Suez Canal in World Affairs (London, 1952); Marlowe, John, Anglo-Egyptian Relations, 1800-1953 (London, 1954); and Hoskins, H.
L., “The Suez Canal as an International Waterway,” 37 A.J.I.L. 373-385 (1943). I hope it will be the policy of the Hon. ladies and gentlemen, on the other hand. Do not let 764 forget the fears that undoubtedly exist in Israel and other countries, which will have the effects of redeployment. The effectiveness of the Israeli army will ensure that this government and other governments concerned have sufficient time to recognize that July 29, 1954 will mark the end of British imperial power in this part of the world and the advent of a new era of friendship and kindness. If that happens, I am sure there will be a new respect, not just for Britain, but for all that it stands for. 8 Canal Company`s status is unusual.
It is registered as an Egyptian company under Egyptian law, but it is incorporated as a limited or anonymous company and is subject to the provisions of the French code that respects these companies. The Paris Court of Appeal is designated as the court of ultimate recourse on legal issues concerning the company. The head office (seat) is located in Alexandria, while the administrative headquarters (administrative residence) is in Paris. See The Suez Canal, Notes and Statistics, by the Suez Maritime Canal Universal Company (London, 1952), particularly at p. 23 and following; Hoskins, H. L., The Middle East 41-56 (N. T., 1954); and Great Britain and Egypt, 1914-1951, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Information Papers No.